Inventory of the best practices on de-radicalisation from the different Member States of the EU
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TERRA is a two year Europe wide Network based prevention and learning Project funded by the European Commission, DG Home Affairs. It is carried out by Impact knowledge and Advice Centre, Amsterdam and AV11M, Madrid.

This Inventory is focused in gathering the best practices on de-radicalization from the different European member states, being expanded to best practices in preventing radicalization leading to terrorism, being achieved a compilation on the most relevant public and private programmes and policies aimed at countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism.

A deep research on the arena has been developed through the analysis of different compilations already delivered as public reports from the European Union, the department of State from USA and other international institutions, as the ones mentioned at the end of our research as our resources.

The aim of this Inventory is to provide all those practitioners, academics and frontliners dealing with this issue, with a tool which could easily approach them to the already successful practices and public policies adopted in the different European member states, delivering an European mapping on Counter violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism.
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Austria

**NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR INTEGRATION.** With the National Action Plan (NAP) for Integration all integration policies of Provincial Governments, Local Authorities, Cities, Social Partners and the Federation were successfully pooled for the first time. For the very reason, that integration is a cross-sectional matter, the corresponding framework conditions can only be created by cooperating with all stakeholders involved. The Action Plan is the result of a comprehensive work process including – in addition to the Federal Ministries involved - all Federal Provinces, the Associations of Austrian Local Authorities and Cities, the Social Partners, the Federation of Industry and organisations from civil society. In parallel, discussions were held concerning individual fields of action both with 150 national and international experts and with migrants’ organisation and citizens. These expert discussions concerning the seven fields of action of the NAP took place between 2008 and late 2009. The NAP for Integration is supposed to provide a structured platform for nation-wide cooperation of all involved stakeholders for successful integration measures and optimise their implementation. In addition to general guidelines for integration policies, the NAP covers challenges, principles and objectives in the following fields of action in a profound manner: language and education, work and employment, rule of law and values, health and social issues, intercultural dialogue, sports and recreation, as well as living and the regional dimension of integration.

In order to achieve a sustainable and optimised implementation of the National Action Plan for Integration, an Integration Panel shall be established in the Federal Ministry of Home Affairs with the participation of all cooperation partners. On the basis of the integration indicators developed by Univ.-Prof. Dr. Heinz Fassmann (University Vienna) the process of integration is to be analysed continuously. Subsequently, measures for optimising the entire cross-sectional matter will be proposed.

Recomendation 2013.

1. Integration from the begins ing
2. Aligning qualified immigration on the country’s own interests
3. Gainful employment and entrepreneurship: getting started, advance- ment, using qualifications
4. Language promotion in good time and conceptually coordinated
5. From compulsory schooling to compulsory training and education
6. Further development of a modern citizenship law
7. Health and care as social challenges
8. For a continutive dialogue about integration
9. Sport, leisure, and volunteering as integration drivers
10. Constitutional patriotism as a foundation of social cohesion
**MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY INDEX.**

MIPEX is a fully interactive tool and reference guide to assess, compare and improve integration policy. ([www.mipex.eu](http://www.mipex.eu))

MIPEX measures integration policies in all European Union Member States plus Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the USA up to 31 May 2010. Data from Australia and Japan was collected up to September 2010 and in Serbia in January 2012, but as there have been no changes since May 2010 the data is directly comparable between the 34 countries. Using 148 policy indicators MIPEX creates a rich, multidimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments’ commitment to integration. By measuring policies and their implementation it reveals whether all residents are guaranteed equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities.

**EIF TRAINING IN DIALOGUE AND INTEGRATION FOR IMAMS, SPIRITUAL ADVISORS AND MOSQUE ASSOCIATIONS**

The project consists of four areas aiming at the promotion of integration and cooperation.

Project area I: Country familiarization training in Austria for religious representatives from Turkey (April 2013)

The Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) sends 10 - 15 imams annually to Austria. As Turkish state officials they complete their tasks during a five year tour of duty in Austria. These imams usually have a high level of professional education (theological, scientific etc).

Even if their activities are contractually regulated through their employment relationship, contrary to imams from other countries, and they have sufficient income (i.e. they do not rely on benefits from mosque communities), delegated imams face several problems during (temporary) “migration”.

In order to tackle challenges such as the lack of knowledge about a country, often no knowledge about the national language (German) and the fact that they have to work and be fully operational in a country and a society they do not even know, the training aims at transmitting knowledge and competences. This should facilitate Turkish imams in Austria to find access to the country and its people as well as to develop a (new) perspective, which responds to the challenges of migration and integration, especially with regard to women, young people and children.

At the sixth “Country familiarization training in Austria for religious representatives from Turkey” the focus was set on the topic “youth” in addition to the core modules (Austrian and European legal system, democracy, state and religion, religious pluralism and freedom, women’s rights etc).
The focus on youth was comprehensively dealt with through relevant presentations about the Austrian education system, the “Challenges of migration for young people” and "Addictive behaviour in young people".

Two excursions, which took the group to the youth welfare office and Gerasdorf prison, deepened the topic. The latter allowed a discussion with young prisoners of Turkish origin.

Project area II: Cultural induction course for religious representatives in Ankara (June 2013)

Since 2012, Austria has been contributing to the six-month mandatory intensive course of the Turkish Presidency Religious Affairs Diyanet as a preparation for a foreign mission (incl. German lessons and cultural training) of religious representatives who are to be sent abroad.

This secures a better preparation of imams for the specific Austrian context. The fourth “induction course of Turkish religious representatives” in Ankara is in the works.


This project aims at involving and supporting female religious representatives. These representatives for women from mosque associations are particularly important with regard to the support and guidance of women and the whole female Muslim community. Participants are strengthened and motivated in their role as representatives for women. A role in which they stand up for Muslim women and families as “integration guides” and thus promote integration in Austria. Another goal is to clarify women their potential as multipliers.

The fourth consecutive training will be held in autumn 2014 and is in the planning.

Project area IV: Training for voluntary delegates for dialogue – to foster intercultural and interfaith cooperation (November 2012)

Approximately 250 mosque associations in Austria with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds have a pivotal role in acting as socio-political networks and provide a wide range of consulting and integration services. Community life and mosque associations are still guided by traditions of the country of origin, are strongly hierarchical and implement activities that are “traditionally” oriented. Except for members and employees with personal commitment, mosque associations and even umbrella organizations do not have the right structures or people who guarantee professional and regular communication, dialogue and cooperation with the Austrian society and institutions. This training strengthens voluntary members in their role as delegates for dialogue, in which they establish and foster contact and dialogue as well as cooperate with the Austrian society and institutions. They therefore provide a bridging function. Moreover, they should serve, present themselves and operate as initial points of contact for Austrian authorities. The relationship and identification with Austria are thus significantly strengthened.
The fourth consecutive training will be held in autumn 2014 and is in the planning.

Belgium

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis and other Belgian governmental partners took further steps to develop the “Action Plan Radicalism.” One of the goals of the Action Plan is to develop measures to limit the impact of violent extremist messaging. The Ministry of Interior continued to coordinate Belgium’s effort to develop a government-wide strategy to counter radicalization and violent extremism.

Belgium is also active in combating radicalisation and recruitment, and in 2005 adopted a “national counter-radicalism plan”.

The plan provides for proactive, preventive and punitive measures to combat, inter alia, the causes of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. It has seven focal points:

1. radical websites,
2. radio and television broadcasts,
3. extremist imams and preachers,
4. cultural centres and associations under Belgian law,
5. radical groups,
6. propaganda centres,
7. prisons.

For each of these areas, an individual action plan has been devised by a pilot service represented in a national co-ordination unit. It involves assessment of the situation, setting of objectives and description of the means to achieve the objective.

CUTA
Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis CoördinatieOrgaan voor de DreigingsAnalyse
Partners represented in CUTA
State Security (Sûreté de l’Etat) Military Intelligence Service (SGRS) Integrated Police Service
Federal Public Service of Home Affairs
Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs
Federal Public Service of Mobility and Transportation Federal Public Service of Finance (Customs Office)

Mission & tasks
Analyze every kind of threat in relation to terrorism and extremism that can endanger the internal as well as the external security of the State
Assess every possible threat towards Belgian interests or Belgian citizens abroad or against all other vital institution of the State.
The participating supply services are obliged to communicate all relevant information concerning possible threats linked to terrorism, extremism and radicalism.

**Threat level**

Very high, High, Medium and Low

**Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1**

**How?**

Issue punctual as well as strategic assessment reports allowing an appreciation of whether threats might manifest themselves or, if already detected, how they are evolving and, as appropriate, what measures prove to be necessary.

The Crisis Center establishes the measures.

Strategic assessments to inform policy makers and officials.

**Involvement in the preparation of the National Security Plan**

Main priorities and tasks for police

Basis for cooperation between federal and local police, police and justice

Preparation : National Police Security Image

Basis for National Security Plan (every 4 year)

Risk analysis (threat, vulnerability, impact) of all criminal phenomena

CUTA coordination terrorism, extremism and radicalism

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CUTA coordination terrorism, extremism and radicalism

Action Plan against violent radicalisation

Mapping potentially violent and extremist streams in society

Reduce the impact of radicalizing entities through administrative measures

CUTA coordinates national taskforce

Local taskforces active in most parts of the country
Bulgaria

Overview: With the assistance of the United States, the EU, and NATO, Bulgaria actively worked to develop improved counterterrorism measures. According to Bulgaria’s lead agency for counterterrorism, the State Agency for National Security, Bulgaria is a potentially attractive target for terrorists based on its strong cooperation with its partners, as well as Bulgaria’s large population of refugees, particularly from Syria and Iran. Bulgaria’s creation of a Crisis Management Unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was developed in 2012 to strengthen Bulgaria’s response to a terrorist attack, among other crises.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: On July 18, a terrorist attack was carried out on a passenger bus transporting Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport. The bus was carrying 42 Israelis who had arrived on a flight from Tel Aviv. The explosion killed five Israelis, as well as a Bulgarian citizen, and injured 32 Israelis. While no organization publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, the plot bears the hallmark of Hizballah. On February 5, 2013, following a lengthy investigation, the Bulgarian government publically implicated Hizballah in the Burgas bombing.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: A revision to Bulgaria’s penal code (enacted in 1968) has been drafted, which includes strengthened and improved definitions for terrorism and organized crime, but it had not been enacted by year’s end.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Bulgaria is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm

Regional and International Cooperation: Bulgaria participated in several bilateral and multilateral fora regarding security and assistance, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative.
Croatia
Partnership for a Better Future
Development Cooperation between Croatia and Afghanistan
Combating poverty is one of the most complex global issues which humanity faces today and which knows no borders. It is closely related to other global issues such as armed conflicts, terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, lack of good management, lack of access to drinking water, increased food prices, the HIV/ AIDS pandemic and other diseases, and climate change. Development cooperation is a mechanism for providing adequate responses to address these global issues. In its implementation, developed countries must work in partnership with developing countries in order to address these matters.

Development cooperation is financial assistance and investment with the express purpose of assisting developing countries in their development and of providing emergency assistance in response to humanitarian crises and their after effects. It represents an important instrument in strengthening global partnership in combating poverty and is crucially important in times of global financial and economic crisis.

The legal and institutional framework for development cooperation of the Republic of Croatia was established in 2009 with the adoption of the Act on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Abroad and the National Strategy for Development Cooperation for the Period 2009 – 2014.

The Role of Croatia as a Young Donor
The Republic of Croatia is a young donor country, building its partner relations with key partner countries through its development cooperation. Profiling itself as a young and reliable donor, the Republic of Croatia is strengthening its foreign policy position. Effective development cooperation also contributes to strengthening the security and stability of Croatia, not only regionally but also within the global framework. Development cooperation remains closely tied to foreign policy and to ensuring the security and economic interests of the Republic of Croatia in third countries, taking into consideration the priority development needs of the partner country. The development cooperation policy of the Republic of Croatia is directed towards combating poverty and creating sustainable and inclusive growth, with special attention given to conflict-affected countries.

Within the policy of providing humanitarian aid, the Republic of Croatia will in the long term direct its efforts towards prolonged humanitarian crises, that is, programmes directed towards development in post-conflict countries and in unstable environments.

Development Cooperation between Croatia and Afghanistan
In countries affected by conflict, where security is the main prerequisite for development, Croatia is successfully linking development co-operation with its participation in international missions and operations. Croatia has been an active donor country in Afghanistan since 2007, and to date has established an important link between security, diplomacy and development which are of vital importance in unstable environments. Development assistance is channelled through the framework of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), through civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), through the training of the Afghanistan Police Force within EUPOL and POMLT, and through the projects of multilateral organisations (IOM and WFP).

To date, Croatia has implemented more than 42 projects in Afghanistan and has provided more than USD 3.5 million in official development assistance. Out of a total of 187 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), Afghanistan holds 172nd place, with a HDI index of 0.398. The Human Development Index in South Asia as a region has increased from 0.356 in 1980 to 0.548 today, which places Afghanistan below the regional average.

Sector and Thematic Priorities
With the aim of creating effective development cooperation and measurable results, Croatia is directing its development projects through four priority sectors: state building, education, health, and development of small enterprises.

1. State Building: Since 2007, two Croatian police officers within the EUPOL Missions and four police officers within POMLT have been training Afghanistan police officers in order to achieve the relevant reforms and institutional reorganisation of the police force;
2. Education: A primary school in Homaro Faroq, a high school in Camp Sakhi, and a library within the high school for girls in Mazar-e-Sharif have been constructed and furnished, while a protective wall has been constructed around the primary school for girls and donations have been made for educational material and school equipment. Support has also been provided over the years for the «School Feeding Programme» of the World Food Programme (WFP);
3. Health: A primary healthcare centre has been constructed in Layoba, and the construction of a midwife training centre has commenced;
4. Development of small enterprises: Support has been provided for the development of craft workers, cutting and sewing lessons have been organised for local women, beehives have been purchased for local women entrepreneurs, and a new project «Carpets from Afghanistan» has commenced also for women entrepreneurs.

Small-scale Projects with Significant Impact
The multiannual implementation of the programme «Small-scale Projects with Significant Impact», with which Croatia is achieving significant results with relatively modest financial contributions (in comparison with long-established donors) and in close cooperation with provincial and local authorities and communities, has led to the recognition of Croatia’s development cooperation and acceptance by the population of Afghanistan.
In previous years, micro projects directed towards strengthening women’s entrepreneur-
ship were implemented: in 2009, the purchase of beehives for a women’s bee cooperative
secured an alternative source of income for a group of women who did not have the basic
means for living; cutting and sewing lessons were held in the province of Feyzabad. Cur-
rently under preparation is the project «Car- pets from Afghanistan», which supports the
production of Afghanistan carpets which are renowned for their quality and which could rep-
resent a highly valued and competitive export product (with a Fair-Trade Certificate).

Within the framework of the programme, the provision of drinking water was established
with the placement of two water pumps. In 2010, the quality of life was improved for 500
families that are 4,000 people, in the village of Gowre Mar near Mazar e Sharif, who did
not have access to clean drinking water. The water pump was constructed to retrieve
water from a depth of 123 metres.

In a five year period (2008 – 2012), a number of projects were implemented in the field of
education: a protective wall around a primary school for girls was constructed; school equip-
ment, computers, furniture and educational ma- terial were donated for schools and
kindergar- tens in the provinces of Badakshan and Balkh. In the same period, support was
provided through the donation of basic food packages. Projects in the field of social
welfare were supported by do- nations of clothing and carpets to orphanages.
Regular donations of military and police equip- ment for training and education were made
to the Afghanistan army and police force.

The «Zar Shahk» primary healthcare centre in Layoba
The first larger infrastructure project of Croatian development cooperation in Afghanistan
was the construction of the «Zar Shahk» pri- mary healthcare centre in the village of
Layoba in the Badakshan province, which was con-
structed in cooperation with the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM).
The centre is being used by 23,000 people from 35 surrounding villages and is valued at
USD 237,000.

Best Practices Homaro Faroq Primary School
The construction of a primary school in the village of Homaro Faroq on the outskirts of
Mazar e Sharif in the Balkh province of northern Afghanistan was carried out in
accordance with the identified needs of the local communi- ty and the Afghan Ministry of
Education. There had been no constructed school in this area and lessons were being
held in three tents which served as classrooms.

The primary school has five classrooms which are being used by 250 children from
Homaro Faroq and surrounding villages. The project, valued at USD 138,500, was
financed by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs within the framework of
development cooperation. Through a set of smaller projects, the school was furnished with
desks, chairs and writing boards. The construction and opening of the school, in addition
to strengthening the de- velopment of the local community, has had a big impact both in
increasing visibility and in improving the acceptance of members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, who are operating in the area of Mazar-e-Sharif. Having identified that two schools in an isolated mountain village in the north of Balkh province were totally lacking in equipment, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs ordered from local craftsman 250 desks and chairs and in coordination with the provincial Department for Education delivered the desks and chairs to the schools. The local craftsman who produces products from wood and metal needed to employ a young apprentice for the implementation of this project, and trained him to build desks and chairs. Croatia is the first donor country to implement a development project in such an isolated and inaccessible mountain area.

The project created multiplier effects: two schools were furnished, small entrepreneurship was developed, an apprentice was trained and gained work experience, and hence an isolated village was developed.

Camp Sakhi High School

With the aim of strengthening the education of girls, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, in cooperation with the Croatian diplomat and officer for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in Afghanistan, implemented the project of constructing a high school in Camp Sakhi in the Balkh province in northern Afghanistan. This was a continuation of the successfully implemented pilot project of constructing a primary school in Homaro Faroq. A total of 600 children will be educated each day in the high school – 300 students in the morning shift and another 300 in the afternoon. The project is valued at USD 147,000.

Library within the High School for Girls, Mazar-e-Sharif

With the aim of educating girls, a library was constructed within the Khorasan High School for Girls in Mazar-e-Sharif. The library measures 158 m2, has two furnished rooms – one with shelves for books and a reading area and one for documents and for the director of the library.

The library will be equipped with a total of 1,923 books in Dari, and a small donation from Croatia of 23 educative books in English has been made. The library is furnished with bookshelves, carpets and chairs. Within the project, an access road was constructed to the school tents which are in front of the library. A metal fence was erected and protective screens were placed on the windows. In the library, four air-conditioners have been installed, due to the fact that the state subsidises electricity, and therefore the costs are much lower than conventional methods of heating – such as by wood or coal. This also reduces the risks of fires. The total value of the project is about USD 140,000.

«Carpets from Afghanistan»

In 2012, a project for women’s entrepreneurship in Mazar-e-Sharif commenced in cooperation with the local non-governmental organisation AID Organisation for Women and Children, AOWC, and a member of the Provincial Council. The project involves hand-
woven carpets, the most important Afghan product and the only one which offers superior quality compared to other global competitors. This project has created jobs for 16 women (15 women in carpet production and one female instructor) who belong to the Hazar ethnic minority.

For the purpose of the project, a small vehicle was purchased (a motorised tricycle with a cabin for the driver and passengers) which is made available for the women working on the project.

In 2013, the second phase of the project «Car-pets from Afghanistan» will be implemented which will be in the form of incentives for work, that is, the amount of produced carpet per hour.

Midwife Training Centre in Mazar-e-Sharif
During 2013, the construction of a Midwife Training Centre in Mazar e Sharif is planned to be completed. On completion, it will conduct training programmes for midwives from regional areas and for medical staff. The project was identified as one of the priority areas of the partner country and is in accordance with the priorities of Croatian development cooperation in the field of protecting reproductive health of women.

Cyprus

Overview: Despite limited resources, Cyprus took a clear stand against terrorism, particularly with its arrest, investigation, and prosecution of a Lebanese Hizballah suspect.

The Republic of Cyprus government was responsive to efforts to block and freeze terrorist assets, sought to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and made significant efforts to conform to EU counterterrorism directives. The Government of Cyprus viewed counterterrorism as a foreign policy priority and partnered with other governments, bilaterally and multilaterally, to fight terrorism. Cyprus' counterterrorism partnership with the United States included regular, routine protection for transiting U.S. military personnel, aircraft and naval vessels throughout 2012, and participation in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance and Regional Security Initiative programs, which strengthened the government's capacity to counter terrorism.

Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the Republic of Cyprus-controlled area, composed of the southern two-thirds of the island, and a northern third, administered by the Turkish Cypriots; the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control over the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part an independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). The United States does not recognize the “TRNC,” nor does any country other than Turkey. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus patrols the buffer zone separating the two sides, but people, narcotics, and other illicit goods routinely cross uncontrolled.
The division of the island has obstructed counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities’ law enforcement authorities, and between Cyprus and Turkey. In the Turkish Cypriot-administered area, issues of status and recognition inevitably restricted the ability of authorities to cooperate on counterterrorism with international organizations and countries other than Turkey. Turkish Cypriots cannot sign treaties, UN conventions, or other international agreements; and lacked the legal and institutional framework necessary to counter money laundering and terrorist financing effectively. Within these limitations, however, Turkish Cypriots cooperated in pursuing specific counterterrorism objectives.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Cypriot government remained committed to conforming to all European Council guidelines for countering terrorism. The Cypriot government invoked its Counter Terrorism Act of 2010 for the first time with the case of a suspected Hizballah operative detained by the Cypriot authorities in July for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists in Cyprus. The prosecution subsequently dropped the terrorism-related charges, in part since Hizballah is not currently listed within the EU as a terrorist organization, to pursue conviction under the penal code for eight other charges, including: conspiracy, consent to commit a criminal offense, and participation in a criminal organization. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found the Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets.

In 2012, Cyprus' National Counterterrorism Coordinator led an ongoing interagency process to develop a new National Counterterrorism Strategy for Cyprus. The strategy is reportedly based on the four EU counterterrorism pillars of "Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond." Security measures were put in place for the protection of western interests and soft targets, especially during Cyprus's Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Authorities issued a number of search warrants in response to suspected terrorist activity but found no evidence of terrorism. Although there were anecdotal reports of a low-level Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) presence, there was no noticeable activity in 2012. Cyprus maintained it was fulfilling all responsibilities with respect to the EU designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization.

Cypriot Police created and put into practice a screening watchlist mechanism. The Police's Counterterrorism Office is watchlisting, among others, all the persons subject to travel bans and asset freezing sanctions by UNSCRs and EU decisions concerning terrorism.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Cyprus is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and its Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. The United States and Cyprus cooperated closely on anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism. Cypriot authorities have taken legislative steps to counter and suppress such activities. The Cypriot Anti-Money Laundering Authority implemented new UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 listings immediately

Regional and International Cooperation: Cyprus participated in counterterrorism initiatives by regional and multilateral organizations, including the UN, the OSCE, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. During the Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU, from July to December 2012, Cyprus chaired the Working Party on International Aspects of Terrorism (COTER) and the Terrorism Working Party (TWP).

The Cyprus COTER chair focused discussions on cooperation in capacity building, intelligence and threat analysis briefings; developments in the Global Counterterrorism Forum; and promotion of human rights while countering terrorism. Other priorities of Cyprus' presidency included exchanging views on international developments, such as the outcome of the Third Review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the prospect of creating a single UN Counterterrorism Coordinator position. Progress was made towards finalizing the EU Counterterrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen. As COTER chair, Cyprus also participated in EU political dialogues held under the European External Action Service Chairmanship, including: individual counterterrorism dialogues with Russia, the United States, and the UN; and the counterterrorist finance dialogue with the United States.

Cyprus' Presidency Program for the TWP led to approval by the EU Council of Ministers of updated EU implementation plans and documents in a number of areas, including protection of soft targets, countering violent extremism, and aviation security. Cyprus' TWP Chair organized an EU conference in Nicosia on October 31, to raise awareness about the importance of protecting aviation from terrorist attacks, and to strengthen cooperation between all public and private services to collectively address this risk. The Cypriot Police's Counterterrorism Office also participated in the EU Police Working Group on Terrorism.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: One of the initiatives of Cyprus' EU presidency in the TWP was revising the EU implementation plan for its Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan and assessing implementation by each member state. Cypriot Police (CNP) started to implement the different measures of the Action Plan, and also focused on educating police officers about violent extremism. The Counterterrorism Office participated as a partner to the Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (COPPRA) project that was initiated by the Belgian presidency of the European Council; the COPPRA training manuals were fully incorporated into the training programs on violent extremism that were created and implemented by the CNP’s Counterterrorism Office.
The CNP Counterterrorism Office provided training programs to prison staff to identify violent extremism in prisons. Under the Radicalization and Awareness Network, the European Commission also provided special training programs and seminars to social workers, health care officials, and other service providers.

**Czech Republic**

Although the Czech Republic is not a country where the co-existence of majority population with immigrants was misused for recruitment by terrorist organisations, it would be a mistake to underestimate this issue. It is a responsibility of the security services to identify problems before they escalate. In this regard, the Czech Republic tries to learn lessons from the developments in Western Europe. Turning a blind eye to the problems related to uncontrolled immigration led to an unpleasant awakening in a number of countries. In the Czech local context the focus of attention should shift to the second generation of "new residents" who have perfectly mastered the Czech language and are perfectly familiar with the local conditions.

The creation of conditions for social consensus between the domestic majority and immigrant population is a key element for the stability of the state. Education needs to be at the heart of the effort to achieve a conflict-free coexistence: intercultural communication, understanding for the differences of other cultures and acceptance of the fact that the culture of each of the communities enriches the Czech society as a whole. However, integration shall not be understood as a synonym for assimilation, but as a process of gradual integration into society, requiring tolerance and mutual understanding of the different practices and culture, while fully respecting the Czech legal order.

Conceptual efforts in the area of integration of immigrants and the protection of the political, economic, social and cultural rights of immigrants in the Czech Republic has, since 1999, been coordinated in accordance with the conclusions of the document "Principles of Integration of Foreigners in the Czech Republic". The latest update of this document took place in 2011. The objective of integration activities is the approximation of the status of immigrants residing in the Czech Republic to the legal status of a citizen and strengthening of the principle of equal treatment of foreigners in employment, business, social security, education, health care and housing. The purpose of the integration policy is to foster the conflict-free coexistence and to prevent closed immigrant communities, social isolation and social exclusion of foreigners.

The integration policy is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. Each year the MoI submits to the government the "Progress Report concerning the Implementation of the Concept of Integration of Foreigners", which specifies the objectives of the integration policy and suggests concrete actions to competent departments in order to foster the integration of foreigners in the Czech Republic. The progress report contains also draft legislative and practical measures. Various integration projects are financed either
nationally or by the EU funding schemes. A large number of foreigners’ integration projects are run by the regional and local authorities and non-profit NGOs. The activities are either of a generic nature (the concept of integration in the Czech Republic) or more specific one (prevention of radicalisation within the immigrant communities, including the possible influence of newly arrived individuals).

The threat posed by some immigrants is likely to continue. Dangerous spawn for radicalisation is to be seen in a growing number of closed ethnic enclaves, which have mainly been due to economic reasons. But it can be assumed that closed enclaves can arise in other backgrounds too: religious, ethnic, etc.

The Police of the Czech Republic takes a systemic approach to the work with minorities and foreigners, since these groups have a significant scope for potential troubles. Since 2005 experts on the work with minorities have been attached to all regional police offices – the "liaison officers for minorities". The liaison officers act as facilitators of contacts and communication between minorities and the police. They are involved in prevention of possible conflicts and serious infringements and offer assistance to members of minorities with specific problems. Liaison officers are assisted by devoted working groups, a total of approximately 150 officers specialize in this issue within the Czech Police. A great deal of effort of the MoI and the Czech Police goes to the education and training of police officers for the work with minorities and foreigners, cooperation with the local and regional authorities, non-governmental sector and academia, to the support of local projects as well as hiring police officers with minority background.

In order to avoid overlaps the concrete steps in this area need to draw on the potential available in the EU and UN parallel activities.

Human factor is a key to success. There is a need to bridge the gap that exists within the security forces as regards personnel resources assigned to the issue of crime potential of closed foreign-language (immigrant) communities (particularly training of specialists, etc.), and to exploit the potential for cooperation of the security community with education institutions in the Czech Republic (language courses, better professional and intercultural skills – innovative approaches to training and/or other ways of getting the educational institutions involved in specific projects). Security experts need training in concrete skills, such as how to distinguish between different cultural backgrounds or whom to talk to in case of problems with a specific community (NGOs, other information sources). The police can seek cooperation with the newly established integration support centres in Czech regions, and with the local projects implemented by municipalities together with the Ministry of the Interior in urban areas prone to coexistence troubles with foreigners. There is also a need to develop procedures for spreading information (through training, etc.) to the local and regional authorities regarding the security risks associated with closed immigrant communities.

Based on experience from abroad, it is appropriate to address the specific aspects related to the prevention of closed immigrant communities and possible radicalisation of their
members, as well as their potential to get influenced by newly arrived radically-minded immigrants (e.g. to prevent the drift towards extremism and terrorism in prisons). A lot has been done at the European Union level (or, as the case may be, in the EU member states) in relation to the prevention of, and the fight against violent radicalisation. However, the Czech Republic cannot adopt all the best practices as they stand. The effort to "actively fight violent radicalisation" shall not lead to a straightforward adoption of measures that had not been thoroughly discussed. At the same time it is not acceptable to apply double standards subconsciously and seek religious or cultural motivation in crimes committed by specific groups from immigrant background.

Combating radicalisation is a long-term and multi-faceted issue. It is extremely difficult. Once again, the public administration needs to step up its communication with the representatives of specific immigrant or religious communities: both at national and regional or local level (security forces, government institutions, teachers, social workers, etc.) to establish indicators of radicalisation, which would make it possible to assess the developments in this field. This is one reason more to commission research projects to study the effectiveness of the specific anti-radicalisation and anti-recruitment measures. Otherwise one can do nothing but speculate whether the action taken brings the expected results. In countering radicalisation account should be taken of the current radicalisation trends, which include a substantial shift of radicalisation from a particular environment (e.g. mosques, schools, prisons...) to the Internet, e. g. taking the form of participation in jihadist forums or activities across the social networking sites.

There is a need to avoid the trap of generalisation. Although illegal activities can be supported just by a negligible number of radicals, the public opinion can tend to associate their attitudes with a whole group. This may backfire as an additional source of radicalisation of a community in question. The problem consists primarily in radicalisation of the few individuals who engage in acts of violence.

All the steps to prevent radicalisation of immigrant communities and the inclination of their members to terrorism need to go hand in hand with actions against the "domestic" extremism, racism and xenophobia and with the educational and awareness-raising activities for general public. The issue is also being dealt with under the government Policy for the Fight against Extremism, which is updated and evaluated every year. It shall be pointed out that no proven link between the "domestic" extremism and radicalisation of immigrant communities has yet been recorded in the Czech Republic.

**Denmark**

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Counter-radicalization programs were first implemented in 2009, empowering local governments to implement initiatives aimed at building tolerance, supporting democracy, and undertaking targeted interventions with radicalized persons. In 2012, the national plan retained the targeted interventions,
administered through the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), and local
governments implemented their own individual programs. Denmark continued to base its
local counter-radicalization programs on a previously existing, nationwide crime-prevention
program of cooperation between schools, social services, and police.

Danish communications efforts to mitigate or counter terrorist propaganda were in the
nascent stages. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration funded small grants to two
immigrant-focused community groups to train employees on how to post positive
messages on the groups’ websites and how to counter violent extremist postings.

PET is establishing “Dialogue Forum” as a series of meetings attended by approximately
50 people twice a year in three major Danish cities (Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Vejle). The
meetings will afford invited members of the Muslim community the opportunity to meet and
discuss issues with PET officials.

The Danish government is continuing two projects previously funded by the EU: “De-
radicalization – Targeted Intervention,” to create mentoring programs and exit interviews
for those desiring to leave terrorist organizations; and “De-radicalization – Back on Track”
with the aim of developing methods for helping inmates affiliated with terrorist
organizations re-integrate into society after serving a prison sentence. Mentoring programs
are continuing at the local level; PET now funds and implements exit interviews. The
inmate program continued to be funded through the EU and administered by the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Integration; 12 mentors have been trained, but mentoring of selected
prison inmates was just beginning at year’s end.

As a number of cases over the previous years have shown, some groups and individuals
in Denmark have the intention as well as the capacity to commit acts of violence, terrorism
or other criminal acts that spring from extremism. But extremism is not solely a threat to
the public security. Intolerant behaviour, rhetoric and propaganda can cause uncertainty
and dissatisfaction in schools, housing estates, local communities and on social fora
online.

For these reasons the Government is working towards preventing extremism and
radicalisation.

The Ministry is, in close cooperation with The Danish Security and Intelligence Service,
responsible for the Government’s policy on the prevention of extremism and radicalisation.
These efforts have so far build on the previous Government's prevention efforts and action
plan "A safe and Common Future" from 2009. In 2014, efforts were evaluated by COWI,
which concludes that the prevention initiatives have achieved satisfactory results. At the
same time, the evaluation identifies areas and challenges where efforts can be
strengthened.

Therefore, the Government has established an inter-ministerial working group with the
Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and the Ministry of
Justice in charge that is in the process of preparing a new national strategy to further develop and strengthen the prevention efforts. The new strategy will include addressing the new challenges of online radicalisation and develop targeted efforts to prevent young people from traveling to for example Syria to participate in armed combat. In addition, it will include the development of new exit efforts to support early exit from extremist groups.

The Government’s existing preventive initiatives include:

- Counselling and training of local staff all over the country

The preventive work is an integrated part of the general crime preventive effort in Denmark. The National Board of Social Services under the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs has in partnership with The Danish Security and Intelligence Service hosted a number of courses for the staff of the crime preventive SSP network. The purpose of the courses has been to prepare staff to handle and prevent problems with extremism. Furthermore regional networks comprised of SSP-resource personnel with particular knowledge of extremism and radicalisation has been established all over the country. The resource personnel advice the rest of the staff on challenges and specific concerns they encounter in their everyday work. The Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and The Danish Security and Intelligence Service are continuously offering further training and counselling to local staff members.

- Distribution of knowledge and prevention tools through the booklet series ‘Preventing Extremism’

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration has developed the booklet series ‘Preventing Extremism’. The booklets present current knowledge about extremism and prevention and a number of specific tools, which can be used in the work towards preventing extremism and radicalisation.

- Mentor scheme in prisons

The Ministry is in collaboration with the Danish Prison and Probation Service conducting the project ‘Deradicalisation – Back on Track’. The project has received founding from the EU. The purpose is to develop and test a mentoring scheme that is specifically targeted at inmates and remand prisoners, who are charged with or convicted of terrorism or hate crimes. Read more about the project ‘Back on Track’.

- Mapping antidemocratic and extremist environments in Denmark

The Ministry has entered into an agreement with The Danish National Centre for Social Research about mapping antidemocratic and extremist environments in Denmark. The purpose is to provide increased knowledge of the organisation of the environments and the methods of recruitment and ultimately adjust and target local preventive response.
The booklet series ‘Preventing extremism’

In the booklet series "Preventing Extremism" you can find information and tools that can be useful in working with preventive efforts.

The booklet 14 cases on handling radicalisation shows how local government employees and other staff in practice have tackled their concerns for young people, who show signs of radicalisation.

The booklet Local Strategies demonstrates how municipalities and police districts have structured professional responses in order to prevent problems with violence etc. connected to extremism and radicalisation.

The booklet Methods for working with radicalisation provides a broad introduction to the signs of concern and preventive responses related to extremism and radicalisation.

The booklet Relational work and mentoring provides advice and specific tools, which can be used in working with building relationships of trust and support positive change for young people, who show signs of radicalisation or are part of extremist environments.

The booklet Antidemocratic and extremist environments provide basic knowledge of the different kinds of extremist environments – their beliefs, activities and methods of recruitment.

‘Back on Track’

Aims/Objectives:

‘Back on Track’ aims to develop and test mentoring schemes as a tool to support inmates in leaving far- right, far-left or religious extremism behind. It has been developed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in close cooperation with the Danish Prison and Probation Service.

Target Audience:

The target group is prison inmates who have either been convicted of terrorism or have been involved in hate crimes or other extremism-related crimes, or inmates who are assessed as being vulnerable to extremism.

Description/Activities:

The mentoring scheme aims at supporting and strengthening the motivation of the inmate to engage in alternative and more positive circles and to stay out of crime and extremist environments when released from prisons. The aim of the project is to support inmates through mentoring to become better in handling everyday situations, problems and
conflicts. Another key element is to focus on engaging families and social networks in order to offer inmates long-term support when re-entering society.

The total budget for the project is approximately €335,000. The EU Commission provides €268,000, while the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration and the Danish Prison & Probation Service each finance the project with contributions of €33,500. The project is set to run until May 2014. The project has been established within the framework of an existing mentor program targeted at different groups of inmates and run by the Danish Prison & Probation Service. There are 13 mentors, of which 3 received additional training in order to be able to coach the others. The mentors were recruited from the Probation Service’s mentor corps and from the De-radicalization-Targeted Interventions project.

Key Points/Lessons learned:
- Training of mentors is an important element of the project. The aim of the training is to build up competences and tools to handle the role as mentors and increase knowledge about extremism.
- The training will focus on techniques in conversation, coaching and conflict management and will focus on how to involve family and social networks more actively.

**DERADICALISATION – TARGETED INTERVENTIONS**

Aims/Objectives: The aim of the project is to develop tools that can be adapted to the individual needs of young people and provide the long-term support and advice that is needed in order to break with and stay out of extremist circles.

Target Audience: Those who are leaving extremist groups in Denmark.

Description/Activities:

In 2009, the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs was granted EU support for a 3-year pilot project on de-radicalisation. Thus, in co-operation with the municipalities of Copenhagen and Aarhus, East Jutland Police District and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), the Ministry launched the Deradicalisation - Targeted Interventions project. The project is part of the implementation of the first principle in the Government’s action plan “A common and safe future”.

The Danish Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs launched the project because there had been several instances where professionals involved in the local cooperation between schools, social services and the police (SSP) and other actors had voiced concerns about young people expressing extremist views or exhibiting discriminatory behaviour towards other groups in their environment. The authorities that receive such reports often lack the relevant tools or measures for helping young people at risk of radicalisation.
One part of the project aims to develop a concept for preventive talks targeted at young people who are part of extremist groups. This part of the project is being developed and implemented by PET. The second part of the project aims to develop a concept for mentoring schemes aimed at young people who socialise with extremists, express extremist views and/or exhibit discriminatory behaviour towards other groups in their immediate environment.

Affiliations to extremist groups can have serious consequences for the future of the individuals, their family, and society. The role of the mentors in Copenhagen and Aarhus is therefore to prevent young people from being recruited into extremist circles, and to support individuals who are in the process of leaving. Leaving an extremist group can be extremely difficult without continuous personal support offered by such mentoring schemes.

Both the mentoring schemes and the preventive talks are intended as voluntary offers to young people.

Therefore, a central aspect of the project is to develop methods for reaching these young people and motivating them to participate in a scheme with the objective of helping them find constructive social alternatives to extremist groups.

The concept for mentoring schemes supplements current prevention initiatives in the municipalities of Copenhagen and Aarhus as well as the East Jutland Police District. Other municipal schemes which are deemed appropriate will also be used to ensure that the best intervention package is offered to the individual in the mentoring scheme. Thus, the project also explores how the various authorities can co-operate in the best possible way to prevent young people from being attracted towards violent extremism.

Key Points/Lessons learned:

-By trialling different approaches in Copenhagen and Aarhus, the project will improve understanding of what works.
-It covers a range of different kinds of radicalisation towards violence.
Estonia


Radicalisation associated with violence is a phenomenon whereby people adopt opinions, views and ideas that may justify and motivate terrorism. Today, radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists are not limited to one religion or collection of political ideas. However, single religious leaders have a direct influence on the emergence of radicalised communities in different countries, including in Western Europe, and they create the grounds for recruitment of terrorists. The Internet is also used for facilitating so-called natural religious awakenings and thereby creating a favourable climate for recruitment to terrorist organisations. Several extremist movements operating in Europe are interested in finding a new and wider platform for their activities and are also trying to expand into Estonia.

Estonia continues implementing a conservative citizenship and migration policy. Improvement of welfare and the standard of living in Estonia increases the number of immigrants who wish to settle here permanently. People try to use illegal methods (e.g. fictitious marriages) as well as legal ones in order to settle here. The experience of other countries shows that increased immigration is associated with the risk that among the new arrivals there will be people who have ties to terrorist organisations or extremist views, as well as people with criminal backgrounds who may start spreading such extremist views and recruiting potential terrorists. In addition to this, such people may assist in the organisation of terrorist training, creation and running of non-government organisations that support terrorism and illicit trade which may indirectly or directly support terrorism. Training means passing on any skills or knowledge that help terrorist crimes be committed. Examples of this are giving directions on how to prepare and use explosives, firearms and other weapons or toxic or hazardous substances or how to carry out cyber attacks, because sharing such skills is most frequently required for committing terrorist crimes.

Estonia is paying particular attention to prevention in order to prevent the activities of movements and people who spread racial, cultural, religious or affiliation hate in Estonia. The earliest signs of radicalism must be prevented, because – as shown by international experience – the growth of radicalism into extremism and then into terrorism is probable and therefore also an undisputed threat to the security of the state.

Application of measures by law enforcement authorities alone is not sufficient for the prevention of the spread of extremism in Estonia – it is necessary to raise the awareness of the society of the dangers of extremism that propagates hate and violence.

As a result of the establishment of a simplified border crossing procedure for EU citizens, and in order to avoid the arrival of people with a terrorist background in Estonia, we must apply the necessary compensation measures to obtain an overview of the people who arrive in the state. In order to obtain information, it is important for law enforcement and security authorities to have access to the main national registers and databases.
administered by various agencies as well as the databases of shipping, airline and tourist enterprises for the purpose of obtaining information.

People who are generally known to spread radical ideas associated with violence must be included in the Register of Prohibitions on Entry. Due to an increase in transit migration and immigration, it is necessary to proportionally increase all resources and means to guarantee measures against radicalisation.

Attention to radicalisation as a factor affecting security must also be paid in countries that have not yet been a seedbed of terrorists or a target of terrorist attacks.

We must continue to pay attention to the contacts of the representatives of international organisations inciting extreme religious, community-based or other intolerant opposition with the local communities, considering the fact that converts and new immigrants are more susceptible to extremist beliefs.

**Finland**

CASE STUDY REPORT
Project Name/Country: National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism, Finland

Aims/Objectives: To enable the development of interdisciplinary knowledge relating to the prevention of violent extremism.

Description/Activities: The National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism was launched in 2012 as a constituent of the ‘Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism’ in Finland. This permanent cooperation team enables the development of interdisciplinary expertise in the prevention of violent extremism, providing a forum in which various professionals discuss current issues and the most suitable responses to them. They work together with local inter-authority cooperation teams who provide logistical support.

The Cooperation Network is responsible for some of the measures outlined in the Action Plan, including: enhancing cooperation to prevent violent extremism; monitoring the status of violent extremism in Finland and Europe; providing information on any local developments to various authorities and local cooperation teams; developing communication between relevant actors; increasing situational awareness and know-how of violent extremism via seminars and training; and producing an annual report of its activities, including an estimate of future developments and recommendations. The network facilitates regular cooperative meetings with the media to challenge hate speech and propaganda. In these meetings, current themes relating to the prevention of
violent extremism are discussed. They aim to introduce alternative perspectives and diverse communication techniques to counteract hate speech. They work in partnership with the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) to increase awareness of, and expertise in, the prevention of violent extremism. The Security Service prepares a bi-annual situation report. The contents of this report are planned in collaboration with the network, and taken into consideration when planning future operations.

Key Points/Lessons Learned:

- Provides a forum in which various professionals can discuss current issues and the most suitable methods for dealing with them
- Monitors the status of violent extremism on a national and international scale
- Holds regular meetings with the media to challenge hate speech and propaganda
- Increases awareness of, and provides expertise on, the prevention of violent extremism

France

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The French government does not have a program in place that specifically addresses countering violent extremism, but considers its integration programs for all French citizens and residents a major tool in countering radicalization and violent extremism in France. Many of these programs target disenfranchised communities and new immigrants. For example, the Ministry of Education works to instill "universal values" in all French pupils, regardless of ethnic origin or country of birth. Ministry regulations mandate that all French public schools teach civic education, and that all students attend school until age 16. The government also offers adult vocational training for older immigrants and/or minorities who never attended French schools. The Ministry of Interior plays a significant role in countering radicalization by targeting areas, neighborhoods, and regions with high criminality and juvenile delinquency rates.

The Ministry of Justice implements rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former criminals. To help curb radicalization, the penitentiary system announced in 2012 that it would increase the number of Muslim chaplains in French prisons in 2013 to 166 (from 151) to help curb radicalization. In 2012, there were an estimated 200 violent Islamist extremists in the French prison system, 60 to 70 of whom were strongly suspected of belonging to a terrorist network. The majority of these prisoners were located in prisons in northern France, the Paris region, and Marseille.

The Plan Vigipirate national terrorism alert system, France

Since 1978, France has relied on a nationwide terrorism alert system called Plan Vigipirate. The system was first established in response to a wave of attacks by left-wing
terrorist groups and successively reviewed and upgraded several times. Since the last revision, in 2006, France has been considered to be under a permanent terrorist threat. The objective of Plan Vigipirate is twofold: (1) to protect the population, infrastructure and institutions; and (2) to increase preparedness in case of attack. The system is under the direct authority of the Prime Minister, who decides, after consultation with the President, to raise or lower the alert level. Changes in the alert level are widely publicized through the media and through other channels of communication between state authorities and the private sector.

The system rests on four principles:
- A posture of vigilance, based on continued analysis of the terrorist threat;
- A comprehensive approach, monitoring the threat against all sectors of society;
- The involvement of everyone, mainly the public authorities and businesses, but also individual members of the public; and
- The gradation of the state’s response to the threat of terrorism.

The system defines four alert levels and corresponding measures to be taken:
- Yellow: measures to increase vigilance;
- Orange: measures to prevent a possible terrorist attack;
- Red: measures to prevent a known risk of one or several serious attacks; and
- Scarlet: measures to prevent the risk of major attacks, simultaneous or otherwise.

Plan Vigipirate is well established and well known by the population. In order to further promote a culture of prevention, the state authorities in France work to raise awareness of the ways to report signs related to potential terrorist activity and concerns about suspicious situations. Individuals are expected to inform, even if in doubt, the nearest police precinct or gendarmerie brigade. A free telephone hotline and an Internet platform have also been established and can be activated in case of a need to allow victims to seek support and witnesses to provide information.

Source: French Government

DELIVERING COUNTER COMMUNICATION, EDUCATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE

Description:
The AfVT.org works with social workers, teachers and other possible victims of terrorism (such as Latifa Ibn Ziaten) in order to expand its programme ‘Terrorism: how about listening to what victims have to say?’ which strives to create a dialogue between victims of terrorism and citizens by organising conferences in schools (private and public), local associations and prisons.

The main objectives of this programme are: to make victims more visible to youth and to promote a sense of citizenship through the victims of terrorism; to involve teachers and pupils in the prevention of radicalisation; to increase the strength of our message on the ground by networking with local actors.

The AfVT.org has also obtained financial support from the European commission for another programme, ‘Gathering of the Victims’. It plans to reunite 20 victims of terrorism.
from very different backgrounds (origins, political opinions), interview them and film their interaction. Those images will then be used to make 20 short films on each victim (5-6 minutes each) and a 26 minutes long documentary. The videos thus created will be posted online and will be downloadable. They will also be used by search engines, such as Google, to offer to individuals looking for extremist contents on the internet.

Information and contact details: Organisation: French Association of Victims of Terrorism

Germany

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Germany has numerous programs to counter violent extremism, at the state and federal levels. In North-Rhine Westphalia alone, there is the “Ibrahim Meets Abraham” community relations initiative; the Information and Education Center against Right-Wing Extremism; the former National-Socialistic Center Vogelsang, which is now used for cultural and civic education; the “No Racism in Schools” and “Prevention of Extremism in Sports” efforts; as well as city programs. Dortmund has a “Prevention of Extremism in the City of Dortmund” program. The German Soccer Federation awards a prize to organizations and persons who use their positions to work for freedom, tolerance, and humanity; and against intolerance, racism, and hatred. Other cities, such as Cologne, host street soccer tournaments to bring together NGOs and at-risk youths. In Berlin, the Violence Prevention Network runs a training program that serves – both during and after detention – ideologically motivated perpetrators.

In January, the Federal Ministry of the Interior established a radicalization help center for parents and friends of violent Islamist extremists. The Interior Ministry started a promotion campaign that included posting simulated missing person notices for fictitious violent extremists who have cut off contact with their friends and families; the notices feature contact information for the radicalization help center. Four Muslim organizations were offended by the campaign and have discontinued their cooperation with the Interior Ministry’s Security Partnership Initiative (SPI), in protest against the Countering Violent Extremism poster project. The Muslim organizations complained that the posters linked Islam to violence. The Interior Ministry plans to continue the SPI.

Germany continued its HATIF (the Arabic word for telephone) program to assist violent Islamist extremists with reintegration. The Interior Ministry also continued a project, first launched in 2001, to stop radicalization among young right-wing offenders. The Ministry expanded the program in 2007 to function in eight states. In 2012, the Interior Ministry also continued a project in three states to counter radicalization of young delinquents influenced by violent extremist ideology.
Provides support structures to enable individuals to leave extreme right-wing movements through on- and offline engagement.

Description/Activities:

EXIT Deutschland performs outreach work to enable individuals to leave extreme neo-Nazi movements in Germany. In 2011 the initiative used music, clothing and social media to scale their impact, seeding one of the most successful online outreach strategies designed to engage right-wing audiences. Based around the theme ‘Get Out of the Scene’, Exit Deutschland set up a task force of private sector representatives, former neo-Nazis and social media experts to assist in maximizing the reach of Exit Deutschland’s campaigning reach.

This resulted in the ‘Trojan T-Shirt’ campaign, in which Exit Deutschland distributed 250 white power t-shirts at a neo-Nazi music festival that when washed altered the logo to ’What your T-shirt can do, so can you - we'll help you break with right-wing extremism’ and included the Exit brand. The initiative made the headlines both on and offline, including mainstream and far-right forums, which even temporarily shut down because of the positive reaction to the initiative. The campaign increased overall awareness of EXIT among right-wingers, trebling the number of self-referrals to its disengagement programme. To maximise the impact of the campaign, Exit produced a video sequencing the production and distribution of the offline campaign.

Key Points/Lessons Learned:
- Performs outreach work to enable individuals to leave extreme neo-Nazi movements in Germany, uses music, clothing and social media to scale their impact.
- Resulted in the ‘Trojan T-Shirt’ campaign where staff distributed 250 white power t-shirts at a neo-Nazi music festival whose logo changed when washed.
- To maximise the impact of the campaign, Exit produced an audio-visual production sequencing the formulation, design and distribution of the offline campaign.

VIOLENCE PREVENTION NETWORK
Aims/Objectives:

This project works with individuals in prison convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right extremism to reject their past, move away from extremism, and forge new lives. It has also recently begun to work with individuals who are religiously radicalised.

Target Audience: The project was set up to target far-right extremists, but has recently been extended to work with religiously radicalised individuals.

Description / Activities:

The Violence Prevention Network runs a project working with individuals in prison who have been convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right and – more recently – religious
extremism. It has been running for over 10 years. The Violence Prevention Network is funded by the Federal Agency for Civil Education, which is part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, but the project is run on an entirely independent basis.

The project has three elements:
- A 23 week programme in the prison with a small group of prisoners;
- One year dedicated support once the individual has been released from prison;
- Support for the individual’s family before and after release

The work with individuals is conducted on a voluntary basis; those taking part are free to leave at any time. Individuals are brought together into small groups of approximately 8 for a 23 week programme, which amounts to an average of 0.5-1 day per week. The unique approach of the training programme is the fact that it brings together social work with civic education in order to disentangle the individual’s sense of anger and hatred from their political view of the world, help in tackling the factors driving their anger and also re-educating them in the ways of democratic society and alternative ways of expressing and answering their concerns.

The programme talks about a ‘hierarchy of needs’ – first is self-responsibility and leaving violence, and second is leaving the ideology. Both are important, but if you attack the ideology first, you leave the individual with nothing and no sense of meaning or worth. In a very few cases the training was in danger of failing because it has been too quick to focus on ideology.

During the training they cover a number of discussion points, with the aim of helping them to reflect on their crime, understand what motivated them to engage in violence linked to extremism, help them identify alternative responses, and offer civic education to help reintegrate them into the ways of democratic culture. They also receive help in alternative ways of handling conflict without resorting to violence.

The training involves discussions, role playing, social work, and other activities. Counsellors also work with the individual to prepare them for life outside of the prison and institutional structures. Individuals receive dedicated support for one year after their release, although in many cases there is contact longer than this. The individual has the name, address and phone number of their mentor (the same person they have dealt with in prison to provide continuity). They meet each month with their mentor, and more often if necessary. Their mentor also helps to find them accommodation and employment, although the latter is becoming more difficult in the current economic climate; and the mentor arranges 3-4 meetings with the individual’s family.

The programme also works with the individual’s family and social networks to help prepare them for the individual’s release, and to better understand the context into which the individual will return. In many cases, the individual is returning to a violent setting; either in the family, or wider social scene. This is especially the case in cities and towns, rather
than rural areas. It is important to be realistic about this, and build the programme and support around the individual to deal with it.

Key Points/Lessons learned:
- A voluntary project so those involved are motivated to take part.
- Only works with individuals convicted of violent crimes linked to radicalisation.
- The programme is scheduled for as close to the individual’s release date as possible.
- Seen to be independent from ‘authority’ this is vital for its credibility and in gaining the trust of individuals involved.
- Programme workers take the individuals and their ideas seriously.
- Contact is consistent and long-term – individuals work with the same person inside and outside of prison so have a trusted relationship.
- It is vital to work with families, although this can be the most challenging aspect of the programme.

Hungary

Haver Informal Jewish Educational Public Benefit Foundation

The word “Haver” means friend in Hebrew just as in Hungarian.

A non-profit organization established in 2002, Haver Foundation stands with individuals and educational organizations and institutions – mostly high schools and universities – to promote a diverse and inclusive society in Hungary. Haver works to combat prejudice and discrimination and to promote social cohesion through dialogue, training, education and advocacy.

We aim to start an open and honest discussion and dialog between Jews and non-Jews that leads to tolerance and common understanding. It is essential to give special attention to the colorful modern Jewish life of the 21st century.

Only a thoughtful youth open to diversity can repel the tendency to Antisemitism and prejudices. The main objective of Haver’s work and activities is to promote mutual respect between people and contribute to the cross-cultural dialog.

We reach five thousand high school students, university students and educators yearly, and provide them a wide range of educational activities and programs.

The educational sessions and activities, which includes subject-specific modules on Shoa, anti-Semitism and Jewish identity forms, is designed in the spirit of anti-prejudice and diversity education: to facilitate dialog and sharing of experiences in the area of religion and culture; to recognize, respect and understand religious, cultural and identity diversity; to confront prejudice and discrimination and to develop individual skills and institutional strategies for creating inclusive inter-cultural environments.
Mission and Goals

The Haver Informal Jewish Educational Public Benefit Foundation’s mission is to foster dialog and spread tolerance through informal education. The foundation fulfills its mission through educational activities, seminars, publications, exhibitions, and exchange programs targeted at youth and teachers.

Haver Foundation is working towards a democratic, diverse, inclusive Hungary to guarantee the peaceful coexistence of its people and citizens. With a Jewish population of over 100,000, Hungary is a major center of Jewish life in the world.

The Founders of the Haver Informal Jewish Educational Public Benefit Foundation are young Hungarians both Jews and non-Jews who wish to reach out to young people in the spirit of the name they chose: friendship and open dialog. We believe that by organizing and conducting open discussions, lectures and educational activities around the subject of Jews and Judaism, we can successfully fight prejudice and misconceptions and promote increased levels of understanding and tolerance.

Haver does a lot with a little due to its large volunteer base

Ireland

The Government of Ireland continued its significant efforts to assist in the integration process of minority groups in Ireland. These measures included providing social benefits, language training, and the proactive advocacy work of an ombudsman’s office.

Italy

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism The Ministry of Justice Penitentiary Police continued financing an NGO-administered counter-radicalization program to place imams in the three prisons where Muslims convicted of terrorism were incarcerated. To counter potential radicalization, the Ministry of Interior conducted training in September for more than 1,000 law enforcement officers in Milan, Turin, and Venice on how to engage more effectively with immigrant communities.

EXIT S.C.S.

EXIT S.C.S. onlus (EXIT cooperative social enterprise onlus) is a NPO that specializes in offering social services for the enhancement of the individual and to counteract all forms of violence and harassment. EXIT S.C.S. onlus has specialized in preventing offenses and crimes in the area of stalking and religious cults, mostly by offering information and
consultation to victims and by planning an exit procedure for her/him that is geared towards the particular situation of the person and the cult context.

With regard to hate crime, EXIT’s work has thus far mainly been around discrimination and violence in religious groups, one-on-one and psychologically abusive group relationships which sometimes bring violence and violation of human rights. EXIT at this point in time has less experience with politically motivated or xenophobic violence. However, especially in bigger cities it can be observed, how phenomena from EXIT’s work with abusive groups overlap and in part coincide with issues of racism, xenophobia and hate crime which often is part of gang activities.

EXIT and its partners use various approaches of educational, consulting and intervention approaches. Conflict resolution and conflict transformation methods are applied in order to prevent the exacerbation of conflict around abusive group issues (conflict in scholastic, judiciary, community, intercultural respects etc.).

In facilitating exit and distancing processes EXIT also uses intensive one-on-one settings. Here the facilitators employ empowering, coping and reflecting strategies in order to psychologically strengthen the clients’ self-esteem and resilience. Voluntary engagement on the side of the client is a methodological prerequisite while motivational interviewing may take place in the lead-up towards a full exit facilitation. Also EXIT facilitators must always consider security issues and assess the level of threat that the cult member is subject to when she or he is attempting to leave.

EXIT’s intervention method varies depending on the case, in particular depending on whether the work is with direct witnesses and victims of abuses (ex-members of cults, harassed employees, victims of violence) or with the families of affected individuals (so that the individual/ relative is not present and can only be indirectly referred to, for example by discussing the personal changes the family has observed with the affected family member).

Information and contact details: Organisation: EXIT S.C.S. onlus http://www.exitonlus.it/

AIVITER

AIVITER realised a training module for the educational system to raise awareness of extremist violence and promote active citizenship among youngsters. AIVITER uses the stories of the survivors, family members, victims of terrorism; terrorism that has marked two decades of recent Italian history. The voices of victims are collected in a multi media project, which exists of an exhibition, DVD documentary, photo’s, a historical atlas of the major national and international terrorism events and a biographical list of more than 500 of the Italian victims of terrorism.

The multi media instruments are used for reflection of what happened in Italian history, increase the remembrance and level of information/knowledge of national terrorism and
the historical and cultural roots. Therefore to encourage youngsters to develop a critical
awareness in politics.

Information and contact details:
Organisation: AIVITER (Italian Association for Victims of Terrorism)
http://www.vittimeterrorismo.it/


The organisation raises awareness of extremist violence and promote active citizenship
among youngsters. This is based on the stories of the survivors, family members, victims
of terrorism Bologna massacre of August 2, 1980. The organisation organises a tour
through the city of Bologna. The route begins at the station, a place of memory of the
event. The route will move on to the headquarters of the organisation of families of the
victims, witnesses of the massacre and to different statues and symbols of remembrance
in the city. Furthermore the organisation produced different multi media instruments like a
CD, a photo exhibition and video testimonials.

The organisation also organises training for teachers. The training provides information
of the political extremism during the seventies and eighties in Italy, for example the massacre
of Bologna but also the terrorism on the extreme left.

Other initiatives are a competition for youngsters about the history and memory of the acts
of terrorism in Italy in the seventies and eighties and in particular the murder of August 2,
1980 at Bologna Train Station. Another initiative is a portal of memory. This is a collection
of information, best practices, stories and research to understand the recent Italian history.
It is accessible and can for example be used in the educational system.

The different instruments are used for reflection of what happened in Italian history,
increase the remembrance and level of information/knowledge of national terrorism and
the historical and cultural roots. Therefore to encourage youngster to develop a critical
awareness in politics.

Information and contact details:  http://www.stragi.it/

Netherlands

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The resilience of the Dutch population to
violent extremism is high. Radical efforts by political and religious leaders seemed to have
little effect on immigrant communities or on the general population as a whole. After
completing the 2007-2011 Action Plan: Polarization and Radicalization, the Netherlands
has shifted from a broad, general, catch-all effort to a more narrowly focused, more
localized approach.
Countering violent extremism is locally organized, instead of relying on national programs. There have been no major communication efforts or public awareness campaigns, because of this emphasis on specific locales. There is a view that national campaigns on violent extremism may actually promote or attract extremism.

The national government serves in advisory and capacity-building roles. Local partners are expected to build upon the knowledge and experiences generated in the past. National support of the local approach is focused on identifying high-priority areas that are of interest to or might host radicalized individuals, and developing specific plans and approaches. The NCTV develops tools and training and offers them to local police departments, social workers, and other stakeholders, both directly and through an online database.

Another focus for countering violent extremism is on lone actors and persons who travel to combat zones. Systems are being built by local governments around these individuals. The NCTV invests in information systems that combine reports and red flags from different parties in order to distill signals about potential actions by violent extremists and to develop a tailored approach. There are a handful of programs, administered to individuals, which focus on disengagement and rehabilitation.

The Netherlands participates in the European Policy Planners Network on Countering Polarization and Radicalization, which is occasionally attended by the United States.

**PERSONAL INTERVENTION AGAINST YOUNG PEOPLE IN RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST CIRCLES**

Aims/Objectives:
To support those on the fringes of right-wing extremist groups in Winschoten to exit from these movements.

Target Audience: Those on the edge of groups rather than hard-core activists.

Description/Activities:
In the early 2000s, the right-wing extremist group Blood and Honour set itself up in Winschoten and started to attract young people through meetings, festivals and concerts. Between 2005-7, there was an increase in neo-Nazi demonstrations, which led to threats, assaults and other problems. The town was asked by Forum, an institute for multicultural issues in the Netherlands, to take part in a pilot project on de-radicalisation. The aim was to counter further radicalisation and social isolation of young people and thus prevent and counter participation in and support for unacceptable social behaviour.

Young people were offered support in withdrawing from the groups through, for example, help in returning to school, getting a job and finding a permanent residence. The goal was not to directly push them to give up right-wing extremist views, but to distance themselves from vandalism, threats and violence.
The local authorities and the government each provided half of the funding. A steering committee was established, comprising centrally-based figures from the police, social services, youth workers, the school administration, a Dutch foundation involved in youth matters, and the local council’s committee for youth issues. It was chaired by the local Mayor.

There was a project managing body, whose role was to identify the young people, make contact with them, and attempt to convince them to get involved. The project ran in 2007-8 and had largely positive outcomes. Fifteen of the 22 young people involved achieved their goals, and by the time the project finished right-wing extremism in the town had been dramatically reduced.

Key Points/Lessons learned:
- Partnership between local authorities and government.
- Bought together a coalition of local actors to identify participants to the project and shape the programme.

**NUANSA**

Aims/Objectives:
Support, raise awareness and enhance expertise of professionals and policy makers while assisting and advising citizens on matters of radicalisation and polarisation.

Target Audience:
National in scope, including wide-ranging support services for local authorities, professionals, parents and young people.

Description / Activities:
The overarching aim of the initiative is to provide an integrated, national-level multiagency approach to the challenge of radicalisation, where “politicians connect with communities; frontline workers go to mosques; police interact with minority groups; so that all the networks are in place”. At its core, the initiative is engaged in three activities; an early-warning and advisory service; a research and information database; and the organisation of meetings, workshops and training sessions for professionals.

The advisory service of Nuansa provides information and advice tailored to the needs of a wide variety of constituencies that have questions or concerns related to radicalisation or polarisation. This includes providing policy advice for local municipalities on best practises in counter-radicalisation, assisting citizens in recognising signs of extremism, building relationships between frontline practitioners to foster better interventions, and inviting youngsters and parents to raise concerns of potential extremism.

Nuansa complements this advisory service with a dissemination database, which acts as a repository of information including local and national policy documents, manuals, evaluations, media documents and social scientific studies. It also includes practical
information related to workshops, conferences and training while highlighting best practises and lessons learned implemented at local and regional levels. As one representative noted; “if you are a teacher and think certain behaviours are suspicious then you should do something about it. Same is valid for the youth workers. It is our job to help them”.

The programme also performs outreach, by training and supporting those carrying out preventative work. Outreach includes presentations and workshops at (annual) meetings and conferences of networks of professionals (education, police, youth workers, youth care), and lectures and seminars at schools and universities. The initiative facilitates the training and exchange of expertise among a wide range of youth workers, social services, frontline practitioners, the police and local government, and has offered bespoke traineeships with the assistance of local government, to train frontline workers across the 25 ‘safety regions’ in the Netherlands.

Key Points/Lessons learned:
- Overarching aim of the initiative is to provide an integrated, national-level multiagency approach to the challenge of radicalisation.
- The advisory service of Nuansa provides information and advice tailored to the needs of a wide variety of constituencies that have questions or concerns related to radicalisation or polarisation.
- Nuansa complements this advisory service with a public information database.
- The programme also performs outreach; training and supporting those carrying out preventative work.
- The programme has offered bespoke traineeships with the assistance of local government, to train frontline workers across the 25 ‘safety regions’ in the Netherlands.

ACTIEPLAN SLOTERVERAART HET TEGENGAAN VAN RADICALISERING (SLOTEVERAART ACTION PLAN TO PREVENT RADICALISATION)

Aims/Objectives:
To increase awareness of the dangers of radicalisation amongst young people in the Dutch town of Slotervaart and engage those already radicalised.

Target Audience:
Young people in the Dutch town of Slotervaart deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation.

Description / Activities:
Following the implementation of a national strategy that emphasised the need to counter radicalisation at a local level, the sub-municipality of Slotervaart was identified as a test case. With high levels of unemployment and a high percentage of the population young, second generation immigrants of Moroccan and Turkish descent, it was identified as area in which there was an acute risk of radicalisation occurring.
Bringing together the local authorities and a range of civil society actors including the ‘Amsterdam Together Forum’, youth groups and mosque federations, the Slotevaart Action Plan worked on three levels to develop a coherent and inclusive response to the issue:
- Micro level: Raising awareness of radicalisation and its dangers, reinforcing this with skills empowerment training so that young people are able to channel their feelings of frustration and alienation more positively.
- Meso level: Placing the issue of radicalisation in its proper social context, for instance highlighting the underlying social problems that push some to radicalism. Bringing the issue out into the open, it also encouraged discussion of the issue in cultural and – importantly – religious institutions.
- Macro level: Worked to put the issue of radicalisation higher up the local agenda. It sought to remove the stigma attached to the issue and foster a discussion about the balance between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

Though, as with all preventative work, it is very hard to measure the absence of radicalisation, the Fac. that the project bought together such a wide range of actors and the local community were receptive to its methods was seen as a model of good practice.

Key Points/Lessons learned:
- Initiated in response to concerns about the radicalisation of young people in the Dutch town of Slotervaart but has been taken forward as a model of good practice for other interventions.
- Increases awareness of radicalisation at a grassroots level and in those groups at risk, channels discontent and anger in constructive ways.
- At a broader level, addresses the place of religion in a secular society.

**Norway**

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Norwegian government continues to implement its plan to counter radicalization and violent extremism. The plan covers 2010 to 2013 and focuses on four priority areas: increased knowledge and information; strengthened government cooperation; strengthened dialogue and involvement; and support for vulnerable and disadvantaged people.

On November 8, the Police Security Services and the Oslo Police announced a plan to address radicalization in Oslo. The plan will be modeled on previous initiatives to de-radicalize members of violent right-wing extremist groups.

**Poland**

Never again is a Polish anti-racist Organization. Its goal is to promote multicultural understanding and contribute to the development of a democratic civil society in Poland and in the broader region of Central and Eastern Europe. Nevr Agin is particularly concerned with the problem of education against racial and ethnic prejudices among the young.
Main activities:

- Monitoring and publishing (through a magazine) racist incidents and other xenophobic crimes committed in Poland as well as sharing information and analysis of hate crime and extremist and racist groups operating in Poland and the rest of Europe.

- Sharing expertise and cooperation with researchers, media, policy makers, national and international organizations.

- Launching of the “Delete Racism” project to combat racism and anti-Semitism on the internet and conducting high-profile educational campaigns in the field of popular culture, “music against racism” and “Let’s kick racism out of the stadiums”

- UEFA EURO 2012 “respect Diversity” programme: major educational and awareness raising activities that took place before and during the European Football Championship in Poland and Ukraine.

Slovakia

Mitigating the Radicalization of Slovak Society: Research and Shaping of Counter-Extremist Strategies

Timeframe: January 2014 – December 2015

Goals:

Due to the long-term failure to address burning issues in the society, including alarmingly increasing tendency of tensions between majority population and minority groups, the increase of sympathies towards extremist groups among population could also be accompanied by increase in active participation, which is dangerous should security forces members be concerned, since they are one of declared sources of military and combat know-how for extremist paramilitary groups. In relation to growing dissatisfaction with socio-economic situation as well as increasing tensions in majority-minority relations, this threat has rising potential and can possibly result in further violent actions. Our aim is therefore to address this situation on two levels. First one lies on the individual level of current and former members of security forces, while second one lies in encouraging of systematic solutions on the political level.

Main Topics:

- Threats and issues regarding the involvement of members of military and police forces in the activities of extremist movements, especially paramilitary groups

- Fear and intercultural tensions with relation to the radicalization of members of security forces
- Involvement of extremism, nationalism and other security issues in European Parliament and municipal elections campaigns in 2014

- Preventing radicalism in the political mainstream through focus on regions and young party members

** PEOPLE AGAINST RACISM

It was formed in order to create an open, tolerant, and multicultural society that respects human rights and individuality of every human being without distinction of sex, race, nationality, religión, sexual orientation, age or education.

It is focused on working with volunteers and the public in general, and has contributed to setting up a documentation and communication center for the fight against racism.

For legal assistance to victims of racism and racially motivated attacks, or any form of discrimination, a hotline has been established, which also serves as a networking tool for obtaining information about the situation in Slovakia.

**Areas:**
- Expertise and monitoring racist manifestations in Slovakia
- Providing free legal assistance to victims of racism and racially motivated attacks, or any form of discrimination.
- Organising cultural and sporting events to disseminate anti-racist ideas by the presentation of different nationalities and cultures.
- Developing educational activities focusing on the issue of racism, totalitarian political sistema or discrimination.
- Working towards eliminating racial abuse in sport.

**Spain**

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Spain participated in several international meetings focused on countering violent extremism. On July 9-10, Spain hosted a GCTF high-level conference on Victims of Terrorism; attended the December 14 GCTF Ministerial meeting in Abu Dhabi; and committed to send experts to participate in Hedayah, the newly established International Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism. Spain’s inter-ministerial CVE working group emphasized the prevention of radicalization and sought to counter radical propaganda both online and in other arenas. In addition to promoting international cooperation on these issues, Spanish efforts to counter radicalization were tied closely to the fight against illegal immigration and the integration of existing immigrant communities. The Spanish government sought the support of civil society and the general public in rejecting violence. In fulfillment of applicable laws,
Spanish prisons employed rehabilitation programs designed to achieve the reintegration of inmates into society.

Sweden

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: On March 22, the Government of Sweden hosted a conference on Sweden’s national action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism. Since the Swedish government announced its first action plan to counter violent extremism in December 2011, several projects have been initiated as part of the implementation process. An expert group has been established and will conduct a study on how work to prevent violent extremism can be carried out more efficiently. Funds have been distributed to organizations that provide individuals with assistance in leaving violent extremist organizations. The National Media Council is conducting a study on how youth are using the internet and how they are influenced by what they read. The Swedish National Defense College was drafting a report on foreign fighters that will include suggestions on preventive measures.

Under the auspices of the EU’s Community Policing Preventing Radicalization and Terrorism (COPPRA) project, the Swedish National Police continued to work to increase knowledge to detect radicalization and added sessions on the topic on the curricula for National Police Academy students. The education material from COPPRA that was translated into Swedish has been used during training sessions to educate police officers who now will “train the trainers” for a wider distribution throughout Sweden.

The Government has commissioned two separate reports that aim to survey existing initiatives to prevent and counter violence-promoting extremism, both in Sweden and internationally. The National Board for Youth Affairs has been commissioned to investigate activities that in various ways help young people leave groups that promote threats and violence in order to achieve political objectives (Government Decision IJ2009/2331/DEM). The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) has been commissioned to survey local efforts to counter and address extremism (Government Decision IJ2009/2136/DEM). For a complete survey and description of existing initiatives, please refer to these reports.43 The examples in Section 6.1 are taken from activities that the Security Service was already aware of or became aware of during the work on this report.

Initiatives in Sweden

In Sweden, the Government has drawn up a national strategy to address the threat from terrorism (Government Communication 2007/08:64), but in contrast to some other countries, Sweden does not have any national strategy to counter the phenomenon of extremism or radicalisation as such.44 Although a majority of those who have become radicalised or are active in violence-promoting Islamist extremism have a connection to...
one of the metropolitan regions Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, the Security Service is not aware of any local or regional prevention efforts specifically targeting violence-promoting extremism. However, all three major cities actively engage in crime prevention efforts, often with a focus on juvenile delinquency and/or organised crime and criminal gangs. The examples below therefore involve national initiatives carried out by government agencies or civil society players, and which are more or less focused on preventing and countering violence-promoting extremism. It should be emphasized that this is not an exhaustive description of preventive and counteractive measures in Sweden. The examples are not arranged in any specific order and should not be perceived as action recommendations.

Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council
The Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council is a collaboration between 14 Swedish government agencies with the objective of strengthening Sweden’s ability to counter terrorism.45 The Council was created on the initiative of the Security Service, the Director General of which convenes the meetings and heads the Council’s work. The first meeting was held in February 2005. The Council’s work involves drawing up action plans for various events and incidents so as to strengthen interagency coordination in the area.

In 2010, the Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council primarily engaged in developing its work in light of the EU strategy to counter terrorism and the Government’s national strategy to address the threat of terrorism. Through this, the Council aims to improve the agencies’ collective ability to:
- Prevent recruitment into terrorism
- Avert threats from existing players
- Protect from terrorism
- Handle the consequences of a terrorist attack.

With regard to tools and strategies to counter radicalisation, the Council’s strategy

KARLSKRONA MUNICIPALITY
Aims/Objectives:
To counter Swedish neo-Nazi related criminality, demonstrations, and violence in the right-wing ideological stronghold of Karlskrona.

Description/Activities:
In response to Karlskrona municipality becoming a stronghold for Swedish neo-Nazism, which perpetuated itself with the formation of the National Socialist Front (NSF) in 1994, a broad spectrum of measures were taken to counter violence, demonstrations, and criminality that emanated from these groups. Political parties, churches, NGOs, sports movements, and unions banded together to establish a municipal network against racism and anti-Semitism.

The network was able to mobilise joint demonstrations against right-wing extremism and initiative school programs to educate youth in matters pertaining to racism. Supplementary to youth education the Children and Young People’s Committee also encouraged engagement in active prevention and intervention against racism and neo-Nazism. In
addition the Municipal Executive Board also allocated funds in support of activities to counter anti-democratic forces. These were available to associations, authorities, individuals or organisations within the municipality that were dedicated to countering anti-democratic forces. The fund allocations were primarily focused on long-term initiatives aimed at targeting children and youth and preventing potential embroilment in racist or right-wing criminality.

Towards the end of the 1990s Karlskrona municipality incorporated further strategies into their wider initiative. At this time efforts were made, in partnership with the relevant authorities, to shut down neo-Nazi websites and bank accounts. With the intention of fostering de-radicalisation and disengagement, some politicians and officials also built personal relationships with neo-Nazis. This proved successful, leading to at least one person leaving the movement. This led to mass media attention which is speculated to have encouraged further de-radicalisation, although the extent of this is not quantifiable. In addition, the municipality paid close attention to getting neo-Nazi group members into work and out of the welfare system in a bid to foster disengagement.

Key Points/Lessons Learned:
- In response to Karlskrona municipality being recognised as a neo-Nazi stronghold, especially in the wake 1994 formation of the NSF.
- Children and Young People’s Committee, Municipal Executive Board, and local schools worked to educate youth in short and long-term initiatives countering racism and anti-Semitism.
- Municipality authorities paid closer attention to tackling the issue through building relationships with neo-Nazis and encouraging individuals to return to work.

EXIT FRYSHUSET,
Aims/Objectives:
To help individuals leave white supremacy groups, and to support them in establishing new lives with economic and social support structures to make their new lives sustainable.

Target Audience:
Set up to target individuals seeking to transition out of neo-Nazi circles, but new sister programme targets those seeking to leave organised criminal groups.

Description/Activities:
EXIT was established in 1998, and is based on the notion that individuals join white supremacist movements not because of ideology, but due to social reasons and the search for status, identity, support and power. Individuals normally enter these movements when they feel excluded or unaccepted by society. The majority of EXIT staff are former members of white supremacist groups, although they are complemented by others, including a physician and psychotherapists. The project has a number of activities:

• Work with individuals to help them leave behind these groups and forge sustainable new lives.
• Work with the families of neo-Nazis to enable them to support young people engaged in or involved with white supremacist groups.
• Education for those frontline workers who engage with young people to enable them to spot vulnerable young people and provide help and support.

EXIT’s work with individuals is based on long-term cognitive treatment, helping individuals to disengage with white supremacist groups and reintegrate into society. It only works with those who have voluntarily come to the programme as it is important that the individual wants to change. Staff engage them in a number of ways, through direct discussions, taking them out for a coffee or to do an activity together, in order to build a good interpersonal relationship. Staff do not talk directly about ideology or try to challenge the ideas of the white supremacist movement, partly because the programme is based on the idea that young people enter these movements for other reasons, but also because the movements school their members with all the relevant counter-arguments so this can be a futile approach to take and simply put the young person into a defensive mode. This work is always conducted confidentially, as former members and their families are often threatened by the movements.

In the early days, staff are on hand 24 hours a day as the young person may need help at any moment and typically won’t have anyone else to turn to as they have often broken ties with family and friends when they entered the movement. They can be offered a range of different types of support: counselling; specialist help from a psychologist or psychiatrist; help re-establishing contact with friends and family; training in social skills; learning how to manage set-backs, how to trust others, and deal with conflict in non-violent way; safe-housing; and help finding a new job and re-establishing their new life. The nature and length of support offered is tailored to the individual, but on average individuals will be involved in the programme for 6-9 months, although the longest involvement has been 8 years.

EXIT also coaches the relatives of neo-Nazis, helping them to develop parenting skills and work through what the family has experienced; they can convene meetings between the family and a range of service providers, should the family request that; and they can assist with police contact and protection where the family has been threatened by the group. EXIT also conducts educational work with professionals working with young people (schools, social services, and police, for example) helping them to understand how the movement is organised, how to reach and influence individuals in these movements, and provides counselling in how to conduct case work. The initiative also collaborates with a local theatre (Theater Fryshuset) which has set up several plays on destructive subgroups (hoodlungs, suburban gangs), and on engagement and disengagement from the white power movement called Hatets Röst/the Voice of Hate. The theatre performs around 20-30 times a year.

The programme believes its approach is relevant to individuals in other kinds of coercive movements, and has just started a sister project for individuals exiting organised crime groups. Moreover, recognising that the radicalisation and community bonding processes of
extreme right-wing movements have largely moved online, former neo-Nazis engaged on
the programme enter internet chat rooms under pseudonyms and with in-depth knowledge
of extreme right-wing discourses and narratives, and actively participate in discussion and
debate. Under the cover of anonymity, the engagement process is designed to introduce
doubt. Importantly, these activities are designed not to prove users wrong, but to gradually
remove black and white thinking.

Key Points/Lessons learned:
- It only works with individuals who have referred themselves to the programme so are
  motivated to change.
- It is mainly staffed by individuals with direct personal experience of white supremacist
  movements, such as formers.
- It is based within a youth centre, Fryshuset, which provides social support and leisure
  facilities for young people. This means it is not isolated, has the backing and support of a
  larger organisation, and is integrated within a wider youth project.
- Focuses on the emotional and social causes rather than ideology.
- It recognises the importance of re-establishing support structures and social networks.
- Has become well-known and so is seen as an enemy by the white supremacist
  movement – this helps to raise its profile among EXIT’s target audience.
- As radicalisation and community bonding processes of extreme right-wing movements
  evolved, the project also performs outreach and engagement work online.

**TOLERANCE PROJECT,**
**Aims/Objectives:**
To provide opportunities for young individuals to take part in educational projects at school
with the aim of disconnecting them with neo-Nazi groups or extremist behaviour.

**Description/Activities:**
The Tolerance Project was developed in 1995 in Kungälv, Sweden, in the wake of the
murder of John Hron by a neo-Nazi gang. The goal of the project in the long-term is to get
rid of social unrest and eliminate intolerance within the local community. It is aimed at
high-school teenagers who have been identified as being at risk of joining the neo-Nazi
subculture and/or becoming future activists. Students are encouraged to apply for the
programme by initially using a field trip as an exciting incentive, and, once the programme
has developed, former participants share their positive experiences of the course to
encourage vulnerable individuals to apply.

The programme relies on an established method of analysis to determine the ideological
core of the structure of the target group, who belongs to it, and their function in the context
of it. From this initial analysis, in conjunction with a detailed understanding of the broader
ideology, the most important activists and their followers can then be identified. Individuals
identified at most at risk will then be given the option to apply to participate in the project.
The identification process is facilitated by co-ordination and liaising with teachers, social
workers and local youth workers, who have detailed knowledge of the local area and the students themselves.

The programme itself aims to disassemble and rebuild the structure where social unrest and intolerance originates, with the work that is involved able to be separated into three parts:

• Splitting activities
• Focus on the future
• Re-socializing activities

Firstly, the school offers activities that are designed to create distance between the core group and their followers, providing individuals with meaningful activities in their spare time, as participants may come from less privileged backgrounds and have limited access to sports clubs or any other organisations. Next, the programme puts a particular priority on teaching programmes that can help participants to focus on their future, and be able to visualise a future in which they can be successful and separate from the group. This depends on the notion that students who achieve better results at school are fundamentally less likely to withdraw into their previous environments. Finally, students are helped to re-socialize by constructing ways for them to attempt to cultivate their own functioning social strategies in groups that they have not done so before. This is facilitated by mixing the groups on the programme - where a group would be comprised of one third A-grade students who are not at risk, and two-thirds targeted individuals - and encouraging them to interact with each other and collaborate during the educational period.

The educational aspect of the project focuses on motivating the students in question to choose studies adjusted to their particular circumstances. In tandem with these studies, a positive social structure is created with the student, where their ability to relate to others in a tolerant manner can be developed. The project is based on a long-term approach and relies on co-operation from all staff within the school. The content in the dialogue between staff and student should be relatable to the student’s life. Otherwise, this education can become the static fulfilling of responsibilities and not the basis for authentic experiences which should illuminate the indispensable value of tolerance.

Key Points/Lessons Learned:
- Time is an important component of the programme, as personal reflection between teaching sessions is crucial to the development of the students.
- The project has developed a successful system for mapping the threat of extremism and determining how many students are at risk, through years of experience working within the community.
- Teachers who are embedded in and have extensive knowledge of the local community is a necessity.
- The programme demands local knowledge of social structures and targeted measures towards specific groups if it is to be successful.
- The project is designed specifically as a long-term approach to tolerance building.
Developing a dialogue between staff and student that is relatable to the student’s life is essential to create an authentic experience for each participant to demonstrate the value of tolerance.

United Kingdom

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: In 2007, the UK launched its Prevent strategy to counter radicalization. Prevent is part of the government’s overall CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. In 2011, Prevent was revised to correct several perceived problems. There had been complaints from members of Muslim organizations that UK government interaction with their communities was focused solely on security concerns. As a result, the UK divided the responsibilities for various strands of Prevent among different government organizations. The Department of Communities and Local Government took over responsibility for “integration” work, designed to ensure that Muslim communities were receiving all the government services to which they were entitled and that immigrants were given assistance to integrate into British society. The Home Office will focus on countering the ideology of violent extremism, including the identification of at-risk youth and their placement in de-radicalization pre-programs. The revised strategy calls for a much more focused effort to target those most at risk of radicalization. Finally, the government has decided that organizations that hold “extremist views,” even those that are non-violent, will not be eligible to receive government funding or participate in Prevent programs.

Work to prevent recruitment into terrorism is of particular interest. It states that for a terrorist attack to take place, individuals would have to adopt violence-promoting ideologies and be prepared to support or use ideologically motivated violence. The preventative work therefore aims to reduce not only the established violence-promoting players’ ability to recruit, but also their potential recruitment base. The idea is to make it more difficult for people who are already violence-promoting to attract new supporters, and to make fewer people receptive to and attracted by violence-promoting ideologies.

The Active Change Foundation (ACF) is an NGO that was set up to deal with serious violence such as gangs, violent extremism and hate crime. The objective of the organisation is to produce and further develop intervention tools and trainings that help to create a better, safer and stronger society by both strengthening community resilience and directly intervening with targeted individuals.

In the area of prevention ACF works on the promotion of religious and societal harmony for the public benefit by facilitating knowledge and mutual understanding between ethnic groups and persons of different faiths. Particularly, ACF promotes a greater inclusion of young people in activities of preventing violent and hateful crime as well as a more trustful rapport between young people and other members of the community, including statutory bodies.
Methodologically, in the area of intervention ACF practitioners have developed a varied and flexible set of sophisticated strategies to engage in one to one interaction with difficult to access individuals that are considered high-risk. To this end tailor made action plans are developed that are geared towards the situational and individual circumstances of the targeted person. In so doing, practitioners are intimately familiar with extremist recruiters’ ability and techniques to take advantage of young peoples’ vulnerabilities. ACF thus engages their clients in a process of challenging, readjusting, and broadening their world-view and develop protective factors to insulate them from being recruited. This also includes raising community awareness on the issue as a tool to both create community collateral and community resilience.

At a national level the ACF is called upon to re-integrate people convicted of extremist activity back into the community. Internationally, ACF provides trainings on both intervention methods and community engagement strategies and thus supports institutions to become more aware of how to best build community resilience to extremist activity. ACF has trained a number of international delegations.

A particularly promising aspect of ACF’s work might be the multi-agency approach in which it is able to work closely with various state agencies and at the same time engage high-risk individuals in the pre-criminal space in a trust-based, open process and personally challenging interaction.

History/Motivation:
The Active Change Foundation was set up to deal with serious violence such as gangs and violent extremism. Its motivation stems from personal experience of individuals and groups that have a designed plan to groom young people into criminal activity.

Objectives:
The objective of the organisation is to create intervention tools to create a better, safer and stronger society where community resilience can act as the deterrent to recruitment into extremism.

Practitioners’ Background:
The organisation comprises of a number of practitioners skilled in building the capacity of organisations to handle the threat of extremism. These practitioners also develop intervention strategies and engage in one to one interventions.

At the heart of the practitioners’ skill sets are their diverse backgrounds. ACF employees understand the grass roots environment and know the different community cultures and subcultures they work in. They are trained to recognise intergenerational and family history issues that relate to experiences of violence, geopolitical conflict and warfare. They are also trained in how to articulate these issues to the statutory sector to inform both policy and strategy. Practitioners are also trained to communicate the mission of preventing violent extremist recruitment to the communities that are affected by it. In this respect ACF has the capacity to create community collateral to deter recruiters from entering communities and institutions.
Clients:
ACF institutional clients are the Office of counter terrorism and a number of local authorities and organisations that manage offenders convicted of extremist activity. This includes the intervention via the United Kingdom’s CHANNEL process. ACF also accept referrals from a number of private institutions, educational departments and individuals and families in the pre-crime space that voice concerns about persons that have not (yet) committed terrorist offenses but are viewed to be susceptible of doing so in the future.

Methods/Approach:
ACF have developed a number of modules to train or intervene in extremist activity on behalf of individuals, private organisations and statutory organisations. Our approach is in accordance with the United Nations peace model, which has been urbanised to have effect on communities at a grass roots level. This allows ACF to scale their models to a local, national or international dimension. Such approaches work on the effective establishment of a value chain predominantly around multi-agency working. ACF applies effective and relevant assessments and identifies the problem. AFC then develops tailor made intervention plans to deal with the targeted persons and affected communities in specific ways. That plan has clear budget lines and measurement tools in place detailing the number of outputs and the desired outcome.

Work Context (local/national):
At a local level ACF works to prevent individuals falling into extremism. ACF acknowledges the recruiters ability to view young people’s vulnerabilities as opportunities for recruitment. The work therefore includes developing protective factors to safeguard young people from being recruited. This also includes raising community awareness on the issue as a tool to both create community collateral and community resilience. The strategy is simple: A strong society cannot be infiltrated by a demonic minority. This work includes community engagement meetings and one to one intervention.
At a national level the ACF is called upon to reintegrate people convicted of extremist activity back into the community. This is the process of readjusting the extremist mindset and is predominantly done through one to one interventions.
Internationally ACF provides trainings on both direct intervention and developing community engagement strategies. Many institutions are unaware of how best to build community resilience to extremist activity. ACF has trained a number of international delegations on that matter.

Quality Management:
ACF models and governance have passed the Office of Security and Counter terrorism external auditors standards. This implies that systems are in place to measure all of ACF's strategic, operational and tactical approaches.

The Security Service’s outreach activities:
The Security Service has conducted outreach activities since 2003. The objective of these activities is to establish direct contacts with strategically important players on the local level, such as community police, city district councils and associations. One particular objective is to create good relationships with Sweden’s practicing Muslims. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the prejudice that many Muslims then faced, and still face, the Security Service aims to show that it is there to serve everyone, as an obvious cooperation partner. It is hoped that the outreach activities will lead to a dialogue that will ultimately contribute to countering potential outbreaks of radicalisation and extremism.

The outreach activities were initially conducted on a small scale, and the first contact was made with Muslim umbrella and national organisations. Over time and through long-term trust-building measures, regular meetings have come to take place with both national organisations and local congregations both in Stockholm and in the rest of the country (based on the Security Service’s regional activities in Umeå, Uppsala, Örebro, Gothenburg and Malmö).

Within the framework of the outreach activities, active efforts are also made to increase the knowledge of Islam in the Police. The community police, local decision-makers and other public agencies concerned are also encouraged to increase their own contact with Muslim groups so as to establish a better dialogue.

Outreach activities give the Security Service an opportunity to exchange knowledge with important cooperation partners, and contribute to answering questions and avoiding misunderstanding, which is a part of preventive efforts in a broader sense. The experience shows the importance of the Security Service being able to offer concrete support and help in various issues and thereby show that the cooperation is based on more than just words. Through a long-term effort to build trust and relationships with representatives of Muslim organisations, the Security Service hopes to create a climate where radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism can be prevented through cooperation.

Centre for information on destructive subcultures (CIDES)
The CIDES project, conducted at Fryshuset in Stockholm, aims to spread knowledge about “destructive subcultures” with the aim of preventing their occurrence, and to reduce the recruitment to and facilitate leaving these circles. Examples of destructive subcultures include violence-promoting extremism, criminal gangs and violent groups within football supporter clubs.

The project has set up a network with representatives from, for instance, the National Board of Health and Welfare, the Police, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, schools and universities, and decision-makers who work on various levels with issues relating to young people. In the network, these people can exchange experiences, identify problems together and work to find solutions.
In addition, young people have been involved in the work through the establishment of three youth councils in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The objective of the youth councils is for young people from disadvantaged environments – from which members in destructive subcultures are often recruited – to concretise and formulate the problems they experience in their daily lives and make suggestions on how they believe problems should be addressed.

Initiatives to facilitate leaving certain groups

At Fryshuset, other projects are conducted to counter recruitment and make it easier for people to leave various violence-promoting circles. The oldest and therefore probably most known project is Exit, which is based on a Norwegian initiative and has existed since 1998. Exit aims to make it easier to leave white-power circles by providing concrete support to young people who want to leave. This is done by providing contact persons, assistance in contacts with public agencies and help in establishing a new identity. Exit also provides counselling and training for professional groups that work with young people, and gives support and guidance to parents of young people who are active in white-power circles. Several those who work with the project have a background in these circles themselves. Passus is a sister project to Exit that, using the same method, seeks to facilitate leaving criminal gangs, support former gang members’ rehabilitation into society and prevent young people from ending up in criminality. A part of this is supporting their families. Here too, there are employees with personal experience, in this case, experience of organised crime. Another organisation that to some extent can provide support to those who wish to leave such organisations is the volunteer organisation Kriminellas revansch i samhället, KRIS (Criminals’ Return into Society, CRIS) that offers a new social network to addicts and criminals who wish to lead a drug-free and honest life.

Hjälpkällan and Föreningen Rädda Individen (FRI) are examples of associations that target those who wish to leave closed religious movements. From a crime prevention perspective, there is a large difference between these movements and criminal gangs or violence-promoting extremist networks. However, since the convincing and recruitment processes often show major similarities with other kinds of extremism, learning from efforts to prevent recruitment to religious extremism is of interest. Although these associations mainly offer support and help to leavers, they also engage in information efforts and support to families. Like Exit and Passus, many of the employees also have a background in a closed movement, although in this case a religious one.

International initiatives

In the same way that the Swedish examples do not constitute a comprehensive description, the following presentation is not intended as a complete survey of international initiatives to counter radicalisation. An attempt at such a survey was made in a UN report from 2008, where programmes and initiatives to counter radicalisation and extremism are described based on questionnaire answers from slightly more than 30 Member States (CTITF 2008). Based on the responses received, the report authors identified 11 action themes: cooperation with civil society, programmes focused on prisons, education, promotion of intercultural dialogue, handling of social and financial inequities, global
programmes for countering radicalisation, measures to counteract radicalisation using the internet, changed legislation, rehabilitation programmes, information efforts and educating public agencies engaging in measures to counter radicalisation.

In this section, three of these types of measures will be described more closely: national action plans, training efforts for particularly affected professional groups and rehabilitation programmes. This selection should not be perceived as a recommendation of these measures in preference to others, but rather is only one way of showing various types of tools and strategies.

**National action plans – Denmark and the UK**

The Danish action plan A common and safe future, published in January 2009, aims to prevent radicalisation and extremist perceptions from spreading among young people (Government of Denmark 2009). It contains a large number of initiatives divided over seven focus areas, including direct contact with young people, dialogue and information, efforts in disadvantaged residential areas as well as initiatives in prisons. Some notable initiatives include a greater focus on radicalisation within the SSP collaboration (schools, social services and police, who are often described as key players in crime prevention in general), increased efforts to counter discrimination, enhanced democracy education, efforts in disadvantaged residential areas and cooperation with sports clubs in these areas.

As early as in 2008, Denmark was appointed by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, as the leading country in the Union with regard to de-radicalisation. This responsibility involves gathering and spreading knowledge on de-radicalisation. In 2009, a project on targeted efforts for de-radicalisation was launched, as part of the implementation of the first initiative of Denmark's action plan. The project (which is predominantly financed by the European Commission) is run by the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs in cooperation with the municipalities of Copenhagen and Aarhus, the East Jutland Police and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). The objective of the project is to develop individualised tools that can serve as support for young people leaving extremist circles. The part of the project for which PET is responsible is to develop a model for how PET can carry out preventive talks with young people in extremist circles, while the other participants are responsible for developing mentorship programmes.

The UK action plan Preventing violent extremism – winning hearts and minds, published in April 2007, is intended to strengthen collaboration with Muslim communities and to isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007). In many ways, the British action plan is an example of a grassroots strategy since the majority of the proposals originate from local players who themselves come into contact with radicalisation trends in their work or their communities. However, much of the local prevention work in the UK has been criticised for not having achieved the desired results. According to critics, tax money has been wasted on irrelevant or unfocused projects, either because the objective of the preventive work was...
misunderstood or because ambition and resources were lacking at the local level. The effort has also been strongly criticised for having contributed to stigmatising and alienating the UK’s Muslims since the initiatives focusing on generally improving the social situation are packaged as a part of counter-terrorism measures. Prevention work in the UK is therefore currently under review, and an updated counter-terrorism strategy will be published in January 2011. It has already been stated that the review will result in a clear division between crime prevention measures (which the Home Office will remain in charge of) and measures for improving integration (which will be led by local authorities).

Educational initiatives for especially concerned professional groups – community police and prison staff Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation and Terrorism (COPPRA) is a cooperative project between several European countries, and is financed by the EU and Belgium. The COPPRA initiative was taken at a meeting of the Terrorism Working Group (TWG) 47 and the work is carried out by a number of EU countries, including Sweden, under Belgian leadership. The project not only targets religious extremism, but also right-wing and left-wing groups as well as other ideologically motivated organisations that may use violence to achieve their objectives. In its first phase, COPPRA aimed to create a tool enabling police on patrol duty to detect early signs of radicalisation, to develop a training manual for this purpose and to identify good examples from various countries. At a meeting in Antwerp in September 2010, a training package was presented containing a description of radicalisation processes and information on how to establish relationships with the local community. The objectives for the first phase of the project were assessed to have been achieved. The material will now be translated into the official languages of the EU, and will be distributed to the member countries around the beginning of 2011. At the same meeting, a follow-up project was also initiated (COPPRA II) which is now in the implementation phase. The project aims to train five or six national instructors from each country so that they can then train police officers in their respective countries. Sweden will probably participate in this follow-up project through the National Police Board and the Security Service.

In 2008, a trilateral project was carried out in the same spirit as COPPRA called Violent Radicalisation: Recognition of and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups Concerned. The project was carried out by France, Germany and Austria with the objective of preparing a handbook concerning radicalisation into violence-promoting extremism in prisons. The handbook is intended for use by the EU Member States in training personnel working in and around prison environments so that they will be able to identify and address signs of radicalisation in prisons. The handbook will be a living document and, in the same way as with COPPRA’s training packages, each country decides if and how they wish to use the material. Sweden participated, through the Swedish Prison and Probation Service and the Security Service, in several of the conferences arranged in connection with the preparation of the handbook.

Rehabilitation and readjustment programmes
In several countries – including Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Malaysia – there are national programmes that offer psychotherapy, vocational training and religious education to
individuals having been involved in violence-promoting Islamist extremism. Several of these programmes have been influenced by Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalisation initiatives, since the Saudi rehabilitation and readjustment programmes are those that have been around the longest (since 2004) and are the most well-financed (Boucek 2008, p. 3). The objective is for those who participate in these programmes to be de-radicalised and at the same time receive help to return to and be integrated into society, and to prevent a new generation from becoming radicalised. However, opinions differ as to how effective these programmes are in general.

In Saudi Arabia, a strategy was chosen that is based on providing in-depth knowledge of Islam so as to counteract the ideological messages spread by violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups. Another important element in the de-radicalisation programmes, besides teaching Islam, is psychology studies. The message being conveyed to the participants is that they were misled by people who distorted Islam (Boucek 2008, pp. 4, 12). The de-radicalisation efforts in Saudi Arabia initially focused on prisoners who were assessed to sympathise with a violence-promoting Islamist ideology, but who had themselves not directly participated in terrorism. The original target group has since been expanded to also include Saudi citizens who had been imprisoned at the Guantanamo base and returnees with experience of combat and illegal acts of violence in Iraq (Porges 2010).

The elements of the de-radicalisation programme that mainly concern readjustment to society also provide assistance in seeking a job or returning to a previous one. Social assistance may also mean that the prisoners’ families receive financial support while the breadwinner is in prison so that extremist networks will not be given the opportunity to offer that help (Boucek 2008, pp. 15, 19-20). Over time, the participants’ families were increasingly involved so as to contribute to preventing their family member from relapsing into extremist activities after release (Porges 2010).

Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalisation work has received both praise and criticism. In June 2010, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior admitted that some 25 of the 120 former Guantanamo prisoners who had undergone the programme had resumed violence-promoting Islamist extremist activities after release. Of those who had relapsed, 11 are assessed to have fled to Yemen and joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. At the same time, the Saudi authorities believe that the total proportion of programme participants who have relapsed into violence-promoting extremism is only between 10 and 20 per cent. However, it is currently too early to say anything about the long-term effects of the programme (Wagner 2010; Porges 2010).
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